

## Friendship and the State

Among the anecdotes collected by Valerius Maximus in the first century A.D., the first Roman example in the chapter on "The Bond of Friendship" (4.7) tells the story of Gaius Blossius Cumanus, who remained loyal to Tiberius Gracchus even after Gracchus had been killed as a public enemy. "Blossius was advancing in excuse his intimacy with Gracchus, but Laelius said: 'What if Gracchus had ordered you to put the torch to the temple of Jupiter Best and Greatest? Would you have obeyed his wishes on account of that so-called intimacy that you are boasting of?' 'Never,' replied Blossius, 'would Gracchus have commanded a thing like that.'" Under Laelius' persistent interrogation, however, Blossius affirms that he would have done that too, if indeed Gracchus had approved it.<sup>1</sup>

I cite this anecdote as emblematic of a way of talking about friendship that casts it in opposition to civic values. Valerius Maximus exhibits the power of the bond of friendship by indicating the enormity of the crime that Blossius is prepared to undertake in friendship's name. As Valerius tells it, Blossius' personal attachment to Tiberius Gracchus overrides the claims of religion and responsibility to the republic. A personal commitment thus takes precedence over public duty.

As a rhetorical strategy, it may seem natural to counterpose friendship as a private bond to the claims of civic virtue. But the notion of a private sphere, understood in opposition to public space, has its own history.<sup>2</sup> By treating friendship as an individual tie that is potentially disruptive to the social order, Valerius has severed friendship from the civic virtues such as justice or piety, or at least marked an area of tension between them. In this

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<sup>1</sup> On Valerius Maximus' way of rescuing historically suspicious characters, including opponents of the Caesars, by incorporating their stories in ostensibly neutral encomiums of virtues such as friendship or fidelity, see W.Martin Bloomer, *Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) 44-48 and 219-22; Bloomer remarks (219) that friendship "provides the pretext for much that otherwise would not appear in Valerius' work."

<sup>2</sup> See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958); Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag, 1962); Paul Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) 31, speaking of the classical Greek democracies: "In short, the peculiar division between a narrow public and a broad private realm characteristic of bourgeois regimes was utterly alien to the Greek experience. The civic community's claim was, in principle, total."

paper, I attempt to trace the development of this rhetoric or discourse and to suggest the social conditions to which it responded.

Valerius derived his anecdote directly from Cicero's account in *Laelius de amicitia*, where Cicero is unambiguous in condemning Blossius' behavior (37). Cicero sets his dialogue on friendship squarely in the context of political turmoil. Writing in the year 44 B.C., when he is engaged in the fatal conflict with Mark Antony that occasioned his *Philippics*, Cicero pretends to reproduce a discourse of Laelius as it was related to him by the augur Quintus Mucius Scaevola in 88 B.C., at the height of the conflict between Marius and Sulla (2); the fictive date of Laelius' original speech, in turn, is 129 B.C., shortly after the death of Scipio, when Rome was — as Cicero represents it — embroiled in the conflict stirred up by the Gracchi. Throughout the *De amicitia*, Cicero returns repeatedly to the problem of friendship in the context of civil strife.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas Aristotle had defined friendship as a function of mutual good will and altruism (*NE* 8.2.1155b31-1156a5), Cicero specifies that "friendship is nothing other than agreement on all matters human and divine together with good will and affection" (6.20). This view was proverbial.<sup>4</sup> By locating the basis of friendship primarily in shared beliefs, Cicero has prepared the ground for a tension between personal alliances and correct political views about the state. Thus, in discussing the reasons why a friendship may be terminated, Cicero mentions not only "a change in character or interests" (*morum aut studiorum*) — motives which Aristotle might also recognize (*NE* 9.3.1165b.13-22) — but also a "disagreement in positions about the state" (*in rei publicae partibus dissensio*, 21.77).<sup>5</sup> There can be

<sup>3</sup> See Eleanor Winsor Leach, "Absence and Desire in Cicero's *De amicitia*," *CW* 87 (1993).

<sup>4</sup> J.G.F.Powell, *Cicero: Laelius, On Friendship and the Dream of Scipio* (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1990) ad loc., cites Aristotle *NE* 9.1166a and *Rhet.* 2.4.1381a, *Cic. Inv.* 2.155, *Planc.* 5, and *Fam.* 5.2.3, as well as the famous formula in Sallust *Catiline* 20.4: *idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est*. Cf. Karl Vretska, *Sallustius: De Catilinae coniuratione* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976) ad loc.; Plautus *Persa* 489 (Toxilus): *numquam enim posthac tibi nec tuorum quoiquam quod nolis nolam*, on which Erich Woytek, *T.Maccius Plautus, Persa: Einleitung, Text und Kommentar* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischer Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1982), comments: "Mit diesem feierlichen Versprechen deklariert Toxilus sich als Freund des leno", and compares Plautus *Rudens* 1045 (Demeas to the two girls): *quamquam vobis volo quae voltis*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. 17.61, where Cicero observes that a bad reputation can reduce one's popularity and hence one's effectiveness in politics. Thomas N.Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," *Apeiron* 23.4

no amicable allegiance with someone who is presumed to be hostile to the republic. Private friendship must, then, be subordinated to the interests of the community.

It might have been supposed that Cicero's own experience was sufficient to inspire an analysis of the tension between friendship and civic duty.<sup>6</sup> However, Aulus Gellius observes in his *Attic Nights* that the problem of how far one should go in violating the law for the sake of a friend was a favorite topic in the philosophical schools, and he cites a Greek formulation of the dilemma: "whether one ought to assist a friend contrary to what is just and to what extent and in what ways" (1.3.9). In particular, Gellius tells us, Aristotle's successor Theophrastus dealt minutely with this most difficult of all issues in the first book of his treatise *Περὶ φιλίας*. Gellius claims further that Cicero, in his own essay on the subject, borrowed freely from Theophrastus but condensed the technical discussion to a bare summary, asserting that there may be a complete community of interest between friends of good character, and that even when the intentions of friends are less than just it is permissible to deviate from the straight and narrow, short of becoming involved in serious dishonor (Cicero *De amicitia* 61, cit. Gellius 1.3.13).

Gellius complains that Cicero's advice is useless unless one knows just how great a dishonor one may sustain for a friend. He cites Cicero's pronouncement that one must not bear arms against one's country (*contra patriam*, Gellius 1.3.19; Cicero *De amicitia* 36) for the sake of a friend, but this, he says, everyone knows. Pericles, Gellius continues, recommended aiding one's friends "but only to the point at which the gods are involved"

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(1990) 182, argues that "the insistence that *amici* must share the same values and hold one another to them is an attempt to enhance the solidarity of the ruling elite".

<sup>6</sup> In *Philippic* II ad init. Cicero is concerned to demonstrate that anyone who is a public enemy (*hostis*) of the state is necessarily also a personal enemy (*inimicus*) of Cicero himself; hence there can be no *amicitia* between Cicero and Mark Antony. Cicero is careful also to distinguish the alliance (*coniunctio*) between Pompey and Caesar from what he represents as his own intimacy (*familiaritas*) with Pompey (10.23). At 15.38 Cicero seems to contradict the view expressed in the *De amicitia* when he asserts that he and Pompey remained friends despite crucial political differences (*quod quidem erat magnum, de summa re publica dissentientis in eadem consuetudine amicitiae permanere*). But he immediately limits the scope of their dissension by noting that each respected the goals of the other, which differed more in priorities than in ultimate aims or values; thus, a harmony of convictions remain the basis of true friendship. For an intriguing but speculative account of Cicero's theory of friendship as a response to Roman aristocratic politics, see Horst Hutter, *Politics As Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship* (Waterloo ONT: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978) 36, 162-64.

(ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῶν θεῶν).<sup>7</sup> Theophrastus, reckoning more precisely, indicated that a moderate degree of disgrace might be compensated by a great service to a friend.

Gellius' claim for Theophrastus' direct influence on Cicero has been disputed. Some critics have argued that Cicero composed the *De amicitia* quite freely, having in mind Greek discussions of the topic, no doubt, but without relying deliberately on any specific Greek models.<sup>8</sup> Others have claimed that Cicero's immediate source was the Stoic Panaetius, but on the issue of whether and to what extent one may prefer the interests of friends to what is just, Panaetius himself, it is allowed, resorted to Theophrastus' discussion.<sup>9</sup>

It would be most interesting to know whether Cicero was following Theophrastus in the passage (36-44) in which he discusses the conflict between friendship and loyalty to one's country, as opposed to doing what is just. Steinmetz (66-76) considers that this section of the *De amicitia* is of Cicero's own invention, and was inspired by his experiences in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Caesar in 44 B.C.<sup>10</sup> It is here that Cicero adduces the examples of Coriolanus, the Gracchi, Blossius, and others. We shall return to this question in the sequel.

In texts of the classical period, friendship is not so consistently or systematically contrasted with other bonds, but is more likely to be seen as continuous with or analogous to familial bonds or social solidarity gene-

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Plutarch *Reg. et imperat. apophthegm.* 186 C, *De vitioso pudore* 531 C, where the phrase is μέχρι τοῦ βωμοῦ; Stobaeus 27.10 Meineke (under Περὶ ὄρκου; attributed to Lysurgus): δεῖ φίλοις καὶ οἰκείοις βοηθεῖν ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ ἐπιπορεῖν.

<sup>8</sup> See Powell (above, n. 4) 20-21 (with brief bibliography).

<sup>9</sup> So Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz, *Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaetios nach einer Analyse von Ciceros 'Laelius de amicitia'* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1967) 191, 199, followed by William W. Fortenbaugh, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam: Verlag B.R. Grüner, 1984) 111-13, 288-89. Steinmetz's distinction between Theophrastus' and Panaetius' treatment of the conflict between *utile* and *honestum* (111-12) seems oversubtle.

<sup>10</sup> Steinmetz (70-76) locates the specific impulse for Cicero's digression in the exchange between Cicero and Matus, a partisan of Caesar's, recorded in *Ad fam.* 11.27-28 (ca. October 44 B.C.). Matus appears, however, to be appealing to a commonplace when he avers (11.28.2) that, in regard to his grief at the death of Caesar, people "say that one's country (*patriam*) should be put ahead of friendship, as though they had already proved that his death was good for the republic". I doubt that Matus' chance phrase alone inspired Cicero's reflections on the problem. Bernhard Kytzler, "Matus und Cicero", *Historia* 9 (1960) 96-121, argues that Matus defends his friendship with Caesar according to the principles articulated by Cicero (see esp. 109-10); Kytzler argument is a response to Alfred Heuss, "Cicero und Matus", *Historia* 5 (1956) 53-73, where earlier bibliography is reviewed.

rally, all of which might be embraced under the label *φιλία*.<sup>11</sup> While Aristotle is careful to note that there are different species or *εἶδη* of *φιλία*, he passes easily from friendship proper, that is, the bond between *φίλοι*, which is mutual and self-conscious, to the one-sided attachment of a mother to her child and other forms, content to explore various aspects of affective ties among human beings without counterposing them or rehearsing at length situations in which they might come into conflict (e.g., whether one should betray countrymen in order to assist a friend). Indeed, Aristotle's strategy of examining *φιλία* in its several manifestations as a single concept or topic, illuminating it now from the angle of the bonds between friends proper, now in the context of parental or wider social attachments, may have contributed to the error among modern scholars of conflating the several types of *φιλία* and imagining that all such bonds constitute the parties so related as friends or *φίλοι*.<sup>12</sup> Hence too the misleading convention of describing the subject of the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and the seventh book of the *Eudemian Ethics*) as friendship.

Far from discovering possible conflicts between friendship and justice, Aristotle argues that without *φιλία*, that is, some bond of sentiment, however tenuous, justice cannot exist.<sup>13</sup>

Feelings of affinity arise, in Aristotle's account, from several sources. As is well known, he specifies pleasure, benefits received, and respect for a person's character as three grounds of affection between friends and other associates. But Aristotle indicates clearly that the awareness of belonging to a common group or kind also produces a sense of *φιλία*. For example, brothers perceive a bond because they are descended from the same pa-

<sup>11</sup> There are, to be sure, exceptions in which a conflict between friendship and justice is broached; cf. Gorgias *Palamedes* 18: *τούτων* [sc. *φίλων*] *ἐνεκά τις ἀν ἀδικήσειεν*. For an illuminating discussion of efforts to resolve such dilemmas, see Mary W. Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 50-53.

<sup>12</sup> On Aristotle's use of the terms *φίλος* ("friend") and *φιλία* ("affection"), see my "Greek Friendship" (forthcoming).

<sup>13</sup> See *NE* 8.9.1159b.29-31: "Insofar as people do something in common (*κοινωνοῦσιν*), to this extent there is *φιλία*; for there is also justice"; cf. 1160a.7-8. Compare also Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 146: "Aristotle seems to make friendship a more important aim than justice (1155a24); and the reason is clear. Justice is the virtue of rewarding desert and of repairing the failure in rewarding desert within an already constituted community; friendship is required for that initial constitution".

rents.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, among all human beings, including slaves and foreigners, there exists *φιλία* and justice by virtue of their being members of the same species.<sup>15</sup> As a cause of a sympathetic relationship, a sense of common identity differs from pleasure, utility, and character in that the reason for the bond precedes any action or interaction by the parties so related. But kinship, participation in the same civic community, and other connections are germane to Aristotle's discussion because he is concerned to account for all the various bases for friendly sentiment and not just for those that he, like us, identifies as friendship proper. It may happen that two people previously unknown to each other discover that they are related as kin; upon this, they may feel an instant attachment grounded entirely in the nature of this tie rather than in qualities of character or mutually pleasing behavior. Aristotle's account of *φιλία* allows for cases of this sort as well as for more personal modes of attachment.

Wherever such feelings arise, moreover, people will, according to Aristotle, recognize claims of justice or fairness. The closer the relationship, the stronger the obligation: one would sooner beat a slave than one's father, even if both actions are wrong (*NE* 8.9.1159b35-1160a8). Such differences in degree of responsibility can lead to conflicts: as Aristotle says, one ought to ransom one's father from slavery rather than pay back a debt to an acquaintance if a choice must be made between the two (*NE* 9.2.1164b30-1165a12). But cases such as this are not examples of a conflict between justice and fellow-feeling or *φιλία*. In each case, the justice of the act — whether rescuing one's parent or paying back a debt — implies the existence of a bond of sentiment between the parties. How friendship, or bonds of *φιλία* generally, might come into conflict with justice is not analyzed by Aristotle because he recognizes justice as coextensive with sentimental attachment. To the extent that there are conflicting demands or obligations across such domains, they are the consequence not of a tension between friendship and what is right, but between different degrees of friendly feeling on a single continuum. All bonds, including civic bonds, rest on *φιλία*.

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<sup>14</sup> *NE* 8.12.1161b30-31: "Brothers [love] each other because they are born from the same [parents]". Aristotle adds that *φιλία* among kin, as opposed to strangers, also "includes what is pleasant and useful in to the extent their lives are more in common" (1162a8-9).

<sup>15</sup> *NE* 8.11.1161b5-8: "Insofar as a man is a slave, there is no *φιλία* with him, but there is insofar as he is a human being. For there seems to be something of justice in every human being toward everyone who is capable of sharing in law and agreement; and thus there is *φιλία*, insofar as he is a human being".

Aristotle recognizes, of course, that a person may act contrary to the interests of a community, and in this way violate the claims of political *φιλία*. But Aristotle represents the problem not as a conflict between friendship and public duty, but as a deficiency in virtue: one may fall short of one's responsibilities to friends as well as to fellow citizens. Indeed, a person wanting in the one arena is likely also to fail in the other, while a good person will be responsive to obligations wherever *φιλία* obtains, whether in personal friendships or in the realm of civic society.<sup>16</sup> Aristotle thus has no strong motivation to investigate minutely situations in which the friendly feelings of a good person will be divided.

The preceding analysis makes all the more vivid the departure from Aristotle represented by Theophrastus' three books *Περὶ φιλίας*, at least as their contents are reported, however partially, by Aulus Gellius. For Theophrastus is said to have concentrated precisely on the occasions on which friendship, or *φιλία*, comes into conflict with what is fine or just. To put it schematically: for Aristotle and writers of the classical period, a man who is loyal to his friends is assumed to be a good citizen, as well as affectionate to his kin; for Theophrastus and afterwards, friendship is posed as potentially antagonistic to civic or national obligations.

I should like to suggest that what enabled this transformation in the perception of friendship, its reduction to a personal as opposed to civic value, was at least in part the emergence of the Hellenistic state as the object of political loyalty. According to the classical definition of Thomas Hobbes and others, the state is characterized by its monopoly of force or police power, and it is arguable that the political institutions of 5<sup>th</sup>- and 4<sup>th</sup>-century Athens (and perhaps earlier as well) do not constitute a state in this sense.<sup>17</sup> A decisive change was inaugurated at the end of the fourth century

<sup>16</sup> See *NE* 9.8.1169a18-20: "Of a serious person it is true that he does many things both in behalf of his friends and in behalf of his country, even if it is necessary to die for them".

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Moshe Berent, "Collective Rights and the Ancient Community", *The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 4.2 (1991) 387-99: "Most of the political systems of the ancient world, including the Greek *πόλις*... were stateless. A political system which is stateless lacks a distinct coercive administrative apparatus which is constituted for the purpose of ruling, and thus it lacks an organ, separated from society, which is responsible for the public realm" (392); Rahe (above, n. 2) 30 (of the classical *polis*): "There was no Greek state" (discussion in n. 10, pp. 801-02); Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 16: "The first formation of permanent armed forces injects something substantially new into world history". The doctrine of the state's "claim to the legitimate monopoly of control of the means of violence" (Giddens 18) was developed princi-

with the reign of Demetrius of Phalerum, supported by Macedon. In a context in which authority was no longer perceived as the institutionalized will of the δῆμος but as an entity backed up by foreign might, public loyalty might be imagined as an abstract duty taking precedence over private attachments. The evolution of this new orientation or problematic in the representation of friendship may well have been materially influenced by Demetrius' close association with Theophrastus and the Lyceum.<sup>18</sup>

Friendship, I am arguing, was conceptually distinct from kinship and civic solidarity in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., but it existed in a continuum of social relations associated by similarity or analogy, all of which might be embraced by the term φιλία. Social relations, including friendship, were not separated off from political obligations in classical Athens because the distinction between society and the state was, like the state itself, inchoate.<sup>19</sup>

The watershed represented by the rise of the Hellenistic states may be seen with particular clarity in the contrast between the following pair of episodes. Toward the end of *Iliad* 9, Ajax declares that Achilles has no concern for "the love of his companions" (φιλότητος ἐταίρων, 630), though the ones who are appealing to him are the "nearest and dearest" (κῆδιστοί τ' ἔμμεναι καὶ φίλτατοι, 642) of the Achaeans. Ajax's special friendship with Achilles is invoked to reinforce, not undercut, his obligation to the army as a whole: his concern for his friends should induce him to rejoin the battle.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the *Roman Antiquities* recounts Marcius Coriolanus' defense of his support of the Volscians in their war with

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pally by Max Weber (cf. Giddens 26-28); for Giddens' own reservations about the state's capacity to back up this claim, cf. 19, 56-58.

<sup>18</sup> An additional reason for Theophrastus' interest in conflicts between friendship and other claims may be, as Jan van Ophuijsen has pointed out to me, that students of Aristotle often elaborated on problems that were left implicit in the master's writings.

<sup>19</sup> For a parallel evolution of ideas of friendship in 18th- and 19th-century Germany, cf. George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 69-70. Contrast also the following two statements: "I much better understand the Duties of Friendship and the Merits of Virtue in Private life, than those of Public: and should never love my Country if I did not love the Best men in it" (letter of Alexander Pope to Hugh Bethel, 14 April 1741); "That outlook which values the collective above the individual necessarily disparages Friendship; it is a relation between men at their highest level of individuality" (C.S. Lewis, *The Four Loves* [1960]; both extracts cit. D.J. Enright and David Rawlinson, ed., *The Oxford Book of Friendship* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991] 20).



Rome. Replying to his friend Marcus Minucius, who had pleaded with him to assist his own people, Coriolanus asserts:

When you still call those my friends, Minucius, who banished me, and that my country (πατρίς) which has renounced me, when you appeal to the laws of nature and discourse about sacred matters, you seem to me to be alone ignorant of the most common things, of which no one else is ignorant: that neither the nature of one's appearance nor the imposition of a name defines what is friendly (τὸ φίλιον) or inimical (πολέμιον), but both are revealed by services (χρεῖαι) and deeds, and that we all love (φιλοῦμεν) what does us good and hate what does us harm.... For this reason we renounce friends when they wrong us and make friends of our enemies when some favor (χάρις) is done for us by them; and we cherish (στέργομεν) the city that gave us birth when it helps us, but abandon it when it harms us, liking (ἀγαπῶντες) it not for the place, but for advantage's sake (8.34.1-3).<sup>20</sup>

By putting both fidelity to country and fidelity to friends on a *quid pro quo* basis, Coriolanus constructs a case in which the merits of foreign friends outweigh his debt to Rome itself. There is nothing new in Coriolanus' utilitarian calculus. My point is that Coriolanus' defense takes the form of an explicit conflict between personal friendship and civic responsibility. The form of the argument is conceivably influenced by Cicero's mention of Coriolanus in the *De amicitia*, where he is described as bearing arms *contra patriam* (36), but it is more likely that Dionysius' rhetorical exercise is indebted to a tradition of Greek diatribe and controversy. In the more distant background, we may perceive, I think, the formative role of Theophrastus in his treatment of the polarity of friendship and duty.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The translation, much modified, follows that of Earnest Cary, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, volume 5, 1945). The passage came to my attention through an unpublished paper by David L. Balch entitled "Friendship in the Historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus"; Professor Balch himself was kind enough to discuss the issues with me.

<sup>21</sup> There is a superficial similarity between Coriolanus' sentiments and those expressed by Alcibiades in defense of his desertion to the Spartans (Thucydides 6.92.3-4): "You, in harming your enemies (πολεμίους), are not more inimical (πολεμιώτεροι) than those who have compelled their friends (τοὺς φίλους) to become enemies. I have a love of city (τὸ φιλόπολι) not insofar as I am wronged, but insofar as I used safely to be a citizen. Nor do I think that I am now marching against what is still actually my fatherland (πατρίδα), but much rather that I am repossessing one that is not. He who is correctly called a lover of his city (φιλόπολις) is not the one who, having unjustly lost his city, does not attack it, but rather the one who on account of his passion for it tries in every way to recapture it". Alcibiades justifies assisting the Spartans on the grounds that his former friends — the Athenians — have become enemies, and he redefines patriotism to include betraying his city to its foes. He does

The possibility that private friendships may be subversive of loyalty to the community is of course mooted in the classical period as well. A well-known example is the speech of Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone*, in which he denounces those who put friends before country (πάτρα):

And he who counts another greater friend (φίλος) than his own fatherland (πάτρα), I put him nowhere. So I — may Zeus all-seeing always know it — could not keep silence as disaster crept upon the town, destroying hope of safety. Nor could I count the enemy of the land friend (φίλος) to myself, not I who know so well that she it is who saves us, sailing straight, and only so can we have friends (φίλοι) at all. With such good laws shall I enlarge our state (πόλις).<sup>22</sup>

Such suspicion of personal attachments among one's subjects is part of the characterization of the tyrant, who sees plots brewing in all associations not directly under his control.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, the conflict between friendship and civic duty is largely moot in the discourse of the democratic polity.

Demosthenes, in his speech *Against Meidias* (21) composed in 348 B.C., accuses Meidias of utter disregard for the claims of friendship. Meidias had emerged from the house of his friend Aristarchus and proceeded at once to denounce him before the Council:

Now, if he said this because he considered that Aristarkhos had committed any of the deeds which brought about his downfall, and because he believed the accusers' statements, even so he ought not to have acted in this way. For friends who are thought to have done something dreadful are punished moderately, by having the friendship broken off; revenge and legal proceedings are left to their victims and enemies.<sup>24</sup>

It is assumed that one never condemns a friend, whatever the nature of his crime. At most, one may cease "to share in what remains of friendship"

not, however, develop a tension between private loyalty to friends and public loyalty to city.

<sup>22</sup> Vv. 182-91, transl. Simon Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 94.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Prometheus Bound* 224-25 (Prometheus to the chorus): ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῆ τυραννίδι / νόσημα, τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ κεποιθέναι; Aristotle *NE* 8.11.1161a32: "In a tyranny there is nothing or little of φιλία". Isocrates 3.54, a tract ostensibly written by the autocratic ruler Nicocles, defines the mutual obligations of ruler and ruled from the point of view of the monarch; to his subjects, the king recommends: "Consider my friendship (φιλία) to be the truest and firmest" — this immediately after he has warned them not to form political associations or ἑταιρεῖαι.

<sup>24</sup> Demosthenes 21.117-18, transl. Douglas MacDowell, *Demosthenes: Against Meidias* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); slightly modified.

(τῆς λοιπῆς φιλίας κοινωνεῖν).<sup>25</sup> Demosthenes acknowledges, as does Aristotle (*NE* 9.3.1165b.13-22), that vicious behavior may justify rupturing a relationship with a friend; the reason for doing so lies in the corrupt character of the person rather than in an abstract obligation to the community. Demosthenes does not broach the issue of a conflict between private loyalty and public duty.

In 331-30, the orator Lycurgus brought charges against a man who, he claimed, had deserted the city of Athens in time of crisis, contending that "it is the responsibility of a just citizen not to summon before public judgment (τὰς κοινὰς κρίσεις), and merely on account of personal enmity (τὰς ἰδίας ἐχθρας), those who have committed no crime against the city, but rather to regard those who have wronged their country as personal enemies (ἰδίους ἐχθρούς), and to hold the public aspect of their crimes as indeed public justification for hostility toward them" (1.6). Lycurgus is not recommending that one bring a personal friend to trial. Rather, he is arguing that one may attack public malefactors as though they were private enemies. Lycurgus is justifying the fact that he is proceeding against an individual with whom, as he alleges, he has no quarrel in his own behalf. Such disinterested action in behalf of the city is suspicious, which is why Lycurgus is obliged to insist on the probity of his motives.<sup>26</sup> Hence too his warning against bringing personal enemies up on public charges. Lycurgus stops short of articulating a tension between loyalty to friends and service to the city.

Lysias, in his oration *Against Eratosthenes*, levels the charge: "But he considered the πόλις to be inimical (ἐχθράν), and your enemies (ὕμετέρους ἐχθρούς) to be his friends" (12.51). Eratosthenes is not accused of having, like Blossius, preferred fidelity to friends over duty to the community. Rather, he is said to have chosen the wrong friends — those who were hostile to the democracy, which is represented in the persons of the jurors. Lysias casts his argument in terms of partisan politics rather than as a conflict between friendship and an abstract ideal of loyalty to the state.

<sup>25</sup> This difficult phrase perhaps means "friendship in future", as MacDowell renders it in the commentary, although in this case one would have expected τοῦ λοιποῦ, and MacDowell is inclined to agree with earlier critics that the reading of the manuscripts reflects a copyist's error. But it is possible that Demosthenes is not endorsing so harsh a condition as complete rupture of friendship even when one of the partners has committed murder, rather, he is simply acknowledging that a friend is exempt, in such a case, from "the remainder of friendship's obligations".

<sup>26</sup> Lysias 12.2 is clear that prosecution was normally understood to result from a personal anathemism or ἐχθρα.

From at least the sixth century B.C., the term φίλος might be used in the sense of “ally”, whether of a foreign power or, where faction prevailed, of a loyal supporter among one’s own people.<sup>27</sup> This latter usage is well attested in Athens toward the end of the fifth century, in the context of the aggressive competition for votes among popular leaders in the assembly and the emergence, in the last decade or so of the century, of serious oligarchic activity. The sense of φίλος as “partisan” is amply illustrated, for example, in Euripides’ *Electra* as well as in his *Orestes*, produced in the immediate aftermath of the revolution of 411.<sup>28</sup> In philosophical and didactic literature (e.g., Aristotle and Plutarch), the distinction between the political sense and the personal is recognized in the treatment of πολυφιλία or extended friendship, which in a civic context might be deemed a virtue, although such multiple attachments were incompatible with intimate friendships among individuals.<sup>29</sup> Correspondingly, in the election manual attributed to Quintus Cicero and prepared, ostensibly, for the sake of his brother Marcus, we read: “But this word, ‘friends’, extends more widely in electioneering than in the rest of life” (*Comm. petitionis* 16).<sup>30</sup> This is not to

<sup>27</sup> For φιλία in early treaties, see Robert A. Bauslaugh, *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 56-64; the inscriptions do not seem to identify the contracting parties as φίλοι. Later, φίλος is very common in such contexts; see Erich S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 54-95.

<sup>28</sup> See D. Konstan, “Philia in Euripides’ *Electra*”, *Philologus* 129 (1985) 192-201. The *Orestes* is particularly instructive for the way in which Orestes and Pylades are united in friendship against their common personal enemies (including kin such as Menelaus); even when they make an assault against the palace of Argos, Euripides does not represent a conflict between personal ties and responsibility to the community. Orestes seeks to reclaim what he regards as his just position at Argos. The issue of an abstract duty to one’s country or πάτρα is moot.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 9.10; Plutarch, *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend* 65A.

<sup>30</sup> The failure to recognize the special sense of φίλος as “partisan” in factional contexts has led to fanciful theories about face-to-face politics in classical Athens based on personal acquaintance. On friendship in politics see W. Robert Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) 41; Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 85; contra: Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology*, trans. J.A. Crook (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 283: “we find plenty of philosophical discussion of φιλία in Xenophon and Plato and Aristotle but no sign, either there or in the historians or the orators, that it was an important political concept — unless we go round about and assert that φίλοι were the same as εταῖροι, and come back to εταῖρεῖται as political groupings. But then we are up against the fact that in the fourth century the εταῖρεῖται do not seem to have been

say that the more restricted sense of friendship was wholly submerged in the political usage; undoubtedly, it could be rhetorically effective to appeal to partisans in the language of personal allegiance (compare "Friends, Romans, countrymen...").

The appropriation of friendship as an image for factional alliances in the context of class strife may have prepared the ground for a discourse concentrated on the tensions between attachments to friends and obligations to the community. One thinks of Thucydides' celebrated description of the Corcyrean revolution (3.82.4-6): "Foolish daring was regarded as bravery and loyalty to comrades (ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος)... Even kinship became less close than comradeship (τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ) because of the latter's greater readiness for daring without justification... They confirmed their trust in each other not so much by sacred oaths as by companionship in crime".<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, in fifth- and fourth-century Athens the relationship between φίλοι does not seem to have been conceived systematically as a private bond in implicit opposition to civic or public commitments. Rather, friendship continues to be broadly congruent with civic solidarity, available as a potential metaphor or model for communal relations rather than being seen as a possible threat or an alternative claim. Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle all treat φιλία or affectionate attachment as an inclusive and coherent topic, shifting easily among its particular aspects as the emotional bond between parents and children, friends, or members of a larger community. It is only with Theophrastus, it appears, that friendship as a field of personal obligations comes to be represented as potentially in tension with the abstract notion of duty rendered by Gellius as *honestas*, corresponding to the Greek τὸ καλόν or τὸ δίκαιον.<sup>32</sup>

If what seem to us to be discrete spheres of social experience — public and private — overlapped in the ideology of the Athenian democracy, this is not necessarily the sign of a primitive constitution, but may rather have been itself the result of a historical process. Brook Manville writes: "Over time, the polis' assumption of once private concerns affected each man's status and behavior as a citizen. So, for example, under the democracy personal morality ceased to be 'personal' because of its perceived relevance to a man's engagement in τὰ πολιτικά.... 'It did not seem possible', said

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political clubs". Hansen neglects, however, considerable evidence for the political use of φίλος.

<sup>31</sup> Translation by M.L. West, ed. and transl., *Euripides Orestes* (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1987) 36-37. I have added the Greek words in parentheses; it is important to note that Thucydides speaks here of ἑταιρία rather than φιλία.

<sup>32</sup> See Steinmetz (above n. 8) 112.

Aeschines, 'to the lawgiver [Solon] that a man who was a scoundrel in his private affairs could be useful in public service' (1.28-30)".<sup>33</sup> Cynthia Farrar develops the point: "The social and political space of the πόλις was not divided into stable enclosed portions; the relation of the individual to the political unit was relatively unobstructed by local power and/or kinship structures, though it was mediated by personal and familial relationships. Friendship was experienced not simply as a source of private satisfaction, but as constitutive of one's social identity".<sup>34</sup> This historically determined congruence between the discourses of friendship and public life, which was integral to the democracy, was disrupted by the advent of the Macedonian hegemony at Athens and the emergence of the Hellenistic state.<sup>35</sup>

The πόλις endured many changes in the course of the fourth and third centuries B.C. that were independent of or parallel to the emergence of the state as such. What we think of as autonomous spheres of culture such as law, learning, and art appear to have been articulated clearly only in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, with the development of the museum, the library, the laws courts as instances of distinct realms of knowledge and authority.<sup>36</sup> In classical Athens, by contrast, the role of the δῆμος as the ultimate source of justice undermined the independent status of the law, just as the civic and religious character of literary and graphic production inhibited the emergence of a distinct sphere of art.<sup>37</sup> So too, the term ιδιότης

<sup>33</sup> Philip Brook Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 23.

<sup>34</sup> Cynthia Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 6.

<sup>35</sup> S.R.F.Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 26, remarks of the rise of ruler cults in the Greek cities: "The crucial development was a form of autocratic rule that was both external to the institutions of the city and yet at least partially Greek"; cf. 19, 38 on the Athenians' hymn to Demetrius the Besieger following the expulsion of Demetrius of Phalerum.

<sup>36</sup> On the emergence of art as a separate sphere in the Hellenistic period, see Jeremy J.Tanner, *The Invention of Art History: Religion, the State, and Artistic Differentiation in Comparative Historical Perspective* (diss., Cambridge University: forthcoming). For the reverse process, whereby the state seeks to absorb the several autonomous spheres of society into itself, cf. Claude Lefort, "The Logic of Totalitarianism", in *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, ed. John B.Thompson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986) 273-91.

<sup>37</sup> Contra David Cohen, *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 79: "Most treatments [of friendship in classical Athens] ... represent friends as belonging to the private sphere." Cohen remarks (85): "Φιλία embodies an idea of friendship where privacy barriers are relaxed, tempering the antagonistic social relations associated with

began, in the fourth century, to designate not just the person who fails to participate in public life, but also, as Maddalena Vallozza observes, "the uncultivated person, the individual who does not play a technical role that is socially useful, who does not possess a special professionalism, a knowledge on the basis of which he can claim a function, manual or intellectual".<sup>38</sup> Increasingly, society was perceived as constituted by multiple spheres and interests.

Similarly friendship, which in the classical period was treated as continuous with civic activity, came to be represented as a separate domain of relations in potential conflict with duty and, in Cicero if not earlier, with obligations to the state.<sup>39</sup> Although the Roman state differed from the Hellenistic monarchies, the tension between friendship and justice adumbrated by Theophrastus could speak to Cicero's concerns about divisions within the ruling stratum and were adaptable to his argument.

I shall conclude with one last example of friendship versus public responsibility. In *Aeneid* 9 Virgil describes the night raid conducted by Nisus and Euryalus upon the enemy camp. As is well known, Virgil modelled this episode on the tenth book of the *Iliad*, in which Odysseus and Diomedes carry out a similar nocturnal attack upon the Trojans. Odysseus and Diomedes return successfully. Euryalus, however, is captured by a troop of horsemen, and Nisus perishes in a vain attempt to forestall and then avenge his friend's death. Virgil has thus synthesized the Homeric episode of the night raid or *Doloneia* with Achilles' response to the death of Patroclus.

While the quality of the bond between Nisus and Euryalus has often been discussed, I should like to call attention to another aspect of the narrative and its departure from the Homeric precedent. The purpose of Nisus and Euryalus' adventure is to get word to Aeneas that the Trojan encampment is in danger of being overrun. The return of Aeneas, as Ascanius ex-

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honor and shame" (85). This view of private versus public spheres derives from modern Mediterranean anthropology (79-83); evidence does not indicate that it applies to classical Athens.

<sup>38</sup> Maddalena Vallozza, "L'oratore, l'incolto e la comunicazione del discorso nel IV secolo a.C." (16), in Adriano Pennacini, ed., *Retorica della comunicazione nelle letterature classiche* (Bologna: Pitagora Editrice, 1990) 15-31.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Jacques Derrida, "The Politics of Friendship", *Journal of Philosophy, Law and Society* (1988) 641-42: "On the one hand, friendship seems to be essentially foreign or unamenable to the *res publica* and thus could not found a politics. But, on the other hand, as one knows, from Plato to Montaigne, from Aristotle to Kant, from Cicero to Hegel, the *great philosophical and canonical discourses* on friendship ... will have linked friendship explicitly to virtue and justice, to moral reason and to political reason". I locate a *coupure* in the discourse concerning friendship between Aristotle and Cicero.

claims, is the sole hope of salvation (9.257). The raid on the Italians is a distraction: useful to the extent that it weakens their forces but wholly subordinate to the primary mission of contacting Aeneas (9.258-62).

When Nisus discovers that Euryalus is missing, he hurls himself into the midst of the enemy. It is a futile gesture, but a dramatic one: Nisus perishes on the corpse of his friend, and Virgil intervenes in his own voice to praise the pair (9.444-49). There is no word of their assignment; Virgil simply celebrates Nisus' sacrifice in behalf of his friend. Yet it is not just his own life that Nisus surrenders for the sake of Euryalus; it is potentially the lives of all the Trojans. Should Nisus have abandoned Euryalus and marched forth to summon Aeneas back to the camp? Nothing in Virgil's text suggests this.<sup>40</sup> Yet Virgil situated Nisus' gesture of supreme devotion in the context of an alternative obligation to the community and to the orders he had received from Ascanius, who was acting as leader of the Trojans in his father's absence. Personal affection toward a friend is implicitly opposed to Nisus' responsibility to the nascent Roman state. Such a tension is, not surprisingly, absent in Homer, where there is scarcely an indication of a state as such. I suggest that it was foreign as well to the discourse of friendship that prevailed in the classical Athenian democracy.<sup>41</sup>

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В статье прослеживается эволюция, которую претерпевает трактовка дружбы при переходе от афинской демократии к государственному укладу последующих эпох. Пока существует классический полис, дружба мыслится как составная часть гражданской активности; в эллинистический и римский периоды дружба, напротив, обычно рассматривается как сфера частных отношений, чреватых конфликтом с обязанностями индивида перед обществом и государством. Каноническим выражением первой точки зрения может считаться "Никомахова этика" Аристотеля, а второй — трактат Цицерона "О дружбе". Автор стремится показать, что переход от классической трактовки к эллинистической знаменует сочинение "О дружбе" Феофраста.

<sup>40</sup> Except perhaps the brief phrase, *quid faciat?* ("what ought he to do?") at 9.399. The story of Nisus foregoing his mission out of love for his friend inverts Aeneas' abandonment of Dido for the sake of duty to a promised Rome.

<sup>41</sup> Versions of this paper were presented at Smith College, Columbia University, Brown University, the Center for Hellenic Studies, the University of Toronto, and the University of Natal at Durban. I am grateful to these audiences for helpful comments, and to Alan Boegehold, Paul Cartledge, and Lene Rubinstein for criticisms of an earlier draft.