

Η ΑΡΧΑΙΑ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ: ISOCRATES AND THEOPHRASTUS

Twice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle focuses on the fact that virtuous behavior is the goal of ethical study. Early in the first book, he tells us that the end of ethics is not knowledge but action, and in this context he asserts that a youth is unsuited for the study of politics/ethics, for he lacks experience, follows his emotions and as a result will not benefit from the study of politics (1. 3. 1095 a 2–6). In concluding the tenth and final book, Aristotle makes very much the same point. We are told that in matters of action the end is not study and knowledge, but rather to act on these matters. Aristotle allows that words can play a protreptic role (προτρέπεια), and in the case of the person who is wellborn and enamored of what is noble they can induce virtue. But in regard to the many, words cannot effect a turn (προτρέψασθαι) toward what is noble and good. For they live by emotion and have no idea of what is noble and good. The soul must first be prepared by habituation to love and to hate properly, and even then grownups must practice and cultivate proper habits (10. 9. 1179 a 35 – 1180 a 5).

These passages are brief, but they can be fleshed out to give a coherent picture. Young people need to undergo training in values. This may be sweetened by the use of poetry and song, and it will be reinforced by reference to citizens, both deceased and alive, whose virtuous actions are recognized as exemplary. In addition, military service will contribute to the development of courage and to a love of one's city. Finally and only with the acquisition of reasoning capacity, the values/moral principles that one has acquired can be reflected upon and tied down by an understanding of human nature and what it means to live in a city-state. Some citizens, perhaps more than we like to think, will never acquire that level of reasoning capacity required for a useful study of moral principles. But those who do reach the requisite level should be exhorted to embrace philosophy and to attend the ethical lectures of philosophers like Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus. Put in terms of writings, the Aristotelian and Theophrastean works entitled *Protrepticus* were intended to promote the study of philosophy, which

includes reading the several Peripatetic *Ethics* or attending lectures based on these works.¹

What now interests me and what escaped my notice until recently is that an adequate account of ethical instruction in the early Peripatos needs to take account not only of protreptic literature and ethical treatises but also of paraenetic address. My failure to consider paraenetic address is perhaps understandable, for neither the noun *παράνεσις* nor the verb *παρανεῖν* occurs in the *corpus Aristotelicum*, and the same is true of the surviving works and fragments of Theophrastus.² But both words do occur in fifth century authors like Herodotus and Thucydides³ as well as in fourth century contemporaries of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Plato uses the verb in both the *Menexenus* 236 E and the *Phaedrus* 234 B, and Isocrates uses the verb in Epistle 2. 1 (= *To Philip* 1. 1) and the noun in the address *To Demonicus* 5. Whether the last named work is properly attributed to Isocrates has been much discussed in the scholarly literature,⁴ but resolving the issue has little or no bearing on what has attracted my attention: namely, a striking connection between the address *To Demonicus* and a Theophrastean excerpt preserved for us in the *Anthology* of Stobaeus (3. 3. 43; vol. 3, p. 207. 16 – 208. 14 Hense = fr. 523 FHS&G).⁵

I begin with the address *To Demonicus*. It divides into three parts, of which the first is introductory. We learn that Demonicus is the son of Hipponicus, who is now dead. The work is said to be a proof of Isocrates' goodwill toward the son and a sign of friendship with the father (1–12). The second

¹Theophrastus' *Protrepticus* is listed twice in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastean writings (5. 49 and 50 = 1. 262 and 284 = fr. 436 no. 33 FHS&G). The title *Ethics* is not listed by Diogenes, but it is found in Plutarch's *Pericles* 38. 2 and elsewhere (fr. 463. 5; 529 A. 6, B. 4; 555. 7 = 436 no. 2 a–b).

²In the 1992 edition of sources (*Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* = FHS&G [Leiden] II 266), the verb is found in line 1 of 440 B, but there it occurs in context material. Theophrastus is quoted later in lines 9–10. The text is missing in Wimmer's collection of Theophrastean sources.

³Hdt. 8. 19, 9. 44, 11. 51; Thuc. 1. 92, 1. 139. 4, 2. 45. 2, 2. 88. 1.

⁴*To Demonicus* is Oration 1 in the corpus of Isocrates' writings. Scholars who reject Isocratean authorship are likely to attribute the work to a member of Isocrates' school. See J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation* (Philadelphia 1986) 19, 125. In what follows, I shall ignore the question of authorship and refer without qualification to Isocrates.

⁵I am indebted to Stefan Schorn for focusing my attention on this connection.

part contains a string of precepts, which if followed will lead Demonicus to virtue and win him high repute (13–43). The third part is a kind of epilogue. Isocrates allows that some of the precepts included in the second part do not apply at the present time but will as Demonicus matures. Emphasis is placed on the pleasure that follows on virtuous toil, and Demonicus is enjoined not only to abide by the precepts already set forth but also to acquaint himself with the poets and other wise persons (44–52).

Of special interest are sections 3–5, which occur within the introductory portion. There Isocrates refers to persons who write protreptic discourses (προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι 3), which are directed toward their friends. These authors are said to undertake a noble task, but others perform a more important one, for they instruct young persons in the ways that win repute for good character. They are said to provide a greater benefit than those (the first mentioned) who only exhort (παρακαλοῦσιν 4) their readers in regard to speech. Not surprisingly Isocrates aligns himself with those who provide the greater benefit. He says that he has written a paraenetic work (παράινεσις 5), and that he intends to counsel Demonicus concerning the goals for which young people ought strive, what actions they should avoid, with what sort of people they should associate, and how they should organize their lives. In general, the contrast here is between those persons (including Isocrates) who offer a basic moral education that is suited to younger people (νεώτεροι 4) and those persons who encourage a theoretical education that is appropriate to older persons. The latter may be said to do something noble (καλόν 3), but in the absence of an early training in sound moral principles, the education that they are encouraging may produce little more than cleverness in speech (δεινότης ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 4).⁶ The former can claim to be doing a greater service, for their aim is to improve moral character (τὸν τρόπον ἐπανορθοῦν 4) by instilling the sound principles that are (ought to be) a prerequisite for theoretical study.⁷

⁶ Cf. *Antidosis* 84, where Isocrates speaks of persons who claim to turn or urge (προτρέπειν) men toward temperance and justice. They are said to exhort men (παρακαλοῦσιν) toward a kind of virtue and practical wisdom, which is unknown to others and disputed (ἀντιλεγομένην) among themselves. The reference to the *Antidosis* is mine, but in regard to the contrast stated above, I have benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee.

⁷ We might say “First things first”. As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, Aristotle is clear that the acquisition of sound moral character should precede

Toward the conclusion of the introduction, Isocrates tells Demonicus that he should imitate and emulate his father's virtue and style of life. And that requires a mind that is full of noble precepts.⁸ Accordingly, Isocrates announces that he will set out concisely certain practices through which Demonicus can make the most progress toward virtue and also win high repute among all other men (12). What follows is the paraenesis proper (13–43), and it is largely in line with Isocrates' announcement. The number of individual precepts is not especially large, and the individual precepts, although they vary in length, are comparatively concise. For our purposes the beginning of the paraenetic segment (13–14) is important. In translation it runs:

(13) First, then, be pious in regard to matters concerning the gods, not only engaging in sacrifices but also remaining true to oaths. For the former is a sign of material prosperity, but the latter is proof of fine and good character. Always honor the divine, and do so especially on civic occasions. For in this way you will be thought both to sacrifice to the gods and to abide by the laws. (14) Be the kind of person toward your parents that you would pray your children might be toward you.

These lines exhibit a striking similarity to the initial two-thirds of the Theophrastean fragment referred to above (523 FHS&G). In translation

the theoretical/philosophical study of ethics and politics. We may add rhetoric, conceived of as the study of persuasive speech. Take deliberative oratory. To be sure, the rhetorician supplies the student with various lines of argument, which may involve moral issues: for example, "Is a particular course of action just, expedient, honorable, necessary?" A relation to moral training is obvious, but it is also clear that the rhetorician is not primarily concerned with his student's moral character. Rather, the rhetorician aims to supply the student with lines of argument, such that he will never be at loss for something to say (ps.-Aristotle, *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1. 1421 b 21–32). In other words, he can always dispute (ἀντιλέγειν) what his opponent may argue, no matter who holds the moral high-ground. And if the student comes to the rhetorician without prior training in moral values, he may come to believe that any course of action can be defended and for that reason is acceptable.

⁸ The noun "precepts" translates ἀκούσματα, which literally refers to things heard. The noun may be used of oral instructions (*LSJ* 3), which might be thought to enliven the address *To Demonicus*. But at the start, Isocrates makes clear that he is sending a written copy to Demonicus (2). I have chosen to translate with "precepts" for that fits the material conveyed in the second part (13–43).

and with section numbers added to facilitate discussion, the fragment runs as follows:

(1) Therefore the man who is going to be admired for his relationship to the divinity must be one who likes to sacrifice, not by offering large sacrifices, but by honoring the divinity frequently, for the former is a sign of wealth, the latter of holiness. (2) Then he must take good care of his parents in their old age and arrange his own life in a way which is obedient to their wishes, for when a man is not of this character, but rather disdainful of the laws of nature and of the city, he has transgressed both kinds of justice. (3) Furthermore, he ought to take good and humane care of his wife and children, for they return the service as their father grows old, while she will give back the kindness in times of sickness and in the daily management of the household.⁹ (4) If it is necessary to loan money to someone, try to do so on a solid basis, for it is characteristic of the wiser man to put out money wisely and regain it on friendly terms, rather than to contract with benevolence and then to recover the loan with hostility.

Points of similarity between the two texts are obvious. Here are five.

1) Both texts begin with transitional words – “first then” (πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, *Dem.* 13) and “therefore” (τοίνυν, fr. 523. 1) – which indicate a close connection with what precedes. In the case of *To Demonicus* the connection is clear. In what immediately precedes, Isocrates has said that he will set out practices that will be useful to Demonicus. He marks the transition to these practices with “first then”. It is impossible to say with certainty what preceded the Theophrastean fragment, but we might take a cue from the Isocratean text and guess that the preceding material was in some way introductory to or explanatory of the precepts that follow.

2) Both texts begin by focusing on sacrifice (*Dem.* 13; fr. 523. 1) and then move on to parents and children: the importance of caring for one’s parents is recognized as is the care that children may return at a later time (*Dem.* 14; fr. 523. 2–3). Beginning a series of action-guiding precepts with recommendations concerning the gods, parents and children seems entirely proper (one might say in accordance with

⁹In his edition of Stobaeus 3, Hense marks a lacuna between sections 3 and 4. The 1992 edition of sources for Theophrastus (above n. 2) follows Hense. I have deliberately not marked a lacuna in the above translation, in order that the reader might be exposed to the text as transmitted.

nature),¹⁰ and that adds some (modest) support to the preceding guess: like *To Demonicus* 13–14, the Theophrastean fragment begins a list of precepts that was at one time preceded by introductory material.

3) In connection with sacrifices, both texts take note of wealth. Theophrastus is explicit in denying the importance of large, expensive sacrifices. He puts the emphasis squarely on character, *οσιότης*, holiness. Isocrates' view is not very different. He writes:

μη̄ μόνον θύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὄρκοις ἐμμένων· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων εὐπορίας σημείον, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς τῶν τρόπων καλοκαγαθίας τεκμήριον.

Not only sacrificing but also keeping your oaths, for the former is a sign of material affluence and the latter a proof of noble and good character.

The *μη̄ μόνον – ἀλλὰ καὶ* construction puts the emphasis on the second half as does the use of *τεκμήριον* in combination with *τῆς τῶν τρόπων καλοκαγαθίας*. And that is in line with later remarks in which Isocrates diminishes the importance of wealth. E. g., after telling Demonicus to believe that many precepts are more important than many possessions (i. e., wealth), he explains that the latter are quickly lost, while the former persist through all time (19). Still later he enjoins Demonicus not to delight in the excessive possession of goods but rather in the moderate use of such things (27). Why then does Isocrates characterize sacrifice as a sign of affluence? The answer is, I think, simple. Sacrifice can be and often is an indication of wealth. Isocrates adds no qualifier concerning appropriate size, because the precepts that he is stringing together are intended to be brief. Moreover, wealth attracts attention and is important to persons who wish to acquire a reputation for, e. g., generosity. Hence, mentioning material affluence here and elsewhere fits Isocrates' concern with reputation: *δόξα, εὐδοξία*. In the introduction, he speaks positively of persons who strive for distinction (*τοὺς δόξης ὀρεγομένους* 1) and says that the practices that he is going to recommend will lead to good repute

¹⁰Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4. 4. 19–20, where the focus is on unwritten laws that are observed in every land. Among these laws, the first is to worship the gods; honoring one's parents comes second. Cf. also ps.-Aristotle, *On Virtues and Vices* 5. 2. 1250 b 19–21, where the subject is justice. Acting justly toward the gods and daemons is assigned first place; parents come third after country.

(εὐδοκιμῆσαι 12).¹¹ Within the precepts that follow, he comments that the many look toward reputation (17) and that the acquisition of good repute is a motive for practicing self-control (21). None of this is foreign to Theophrastus, who not only counts wealth and reputation among the external goods but also believes that a young person's natural desire for praise can play an important role in education. The virtues, he says, are established through praise and subsequently increased (developed) by being stirred with pride (fr. 467. 5–7). Moreover and most important, at the beginning of fr. 523 Theophrastus exhibits a clear awareness of reputation as a motivating factor. He says that the man who is going to be admired (τὸν μάλλοντα θαυμασθήσεσθαι) for his relationship to the divinity must be one who likes to sacrifice, after which comes the important qualifier concerning frequent as against large sacrifices (1).¹²

4) In both texts, the authors add explanations, often introduced by “for”, γάρ (twice in *Dem.* 13 and four times in fr. 523. 1–4).¹³ That is of some importance, for it makes clear that neither Isocrates nor Theophrastus is satisfied with simple directives. A paraenetic address is directed toward a human being and human beings by nature want explanations when they are told how they should act. Indeed, when they are offered an appropriate explanation, human beings are apt to become cooperative and act as instructed. To make the point, I cite Plato, who in the *Laws* has the Athenian Stranger argue that all acts of legislation should be accompanied by an explanatory preamble that will promote law-abiding behavior (4. 719 E – 723 D).¹⁴ Rather different and perhaps more striking

¹¹ See also section 4, in which Isocrates speaks highly of those who benefit young persons by advising them how they may win repute as men of good character.

¹² Concerning frequent sacrifice, cf. fr. 584 A. 142–144 (from *On Piety*), where Theophrastus argues in favor of vegetable sacrifice and against animal sacrifice, saying that the former is inexpensive and contributes to continual piety (πρὸς συνεχῆ εὐσέβειαν συντελεῖ). For discussion see my article “Theophrastus: Piety, Justice and Animals,” in W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Theophrastean Studies*, Philosophie der Antike 17 (Stuttgart 2003) 182–183.

¹³ I focus on γάρ, for it is especially prominent. In *To Demoniacus* 13–43, it occurs 50 times, but an explanation may take a different form, e. g., a purpose clause introduced by ὅπως or ἵνα (21, 26) or by a prepositional phrase introduced by ἔνεκεν (28).

¹⁴ Although Plato speaks of preambles that precede the law itself, his example of legislation concerning marriage reverses the order (721 B–D). In paraenetic ad-

is what Aristotle says concerning slaves. In the *Politics*, he recommends adding explanation when admonishing slaves. He thinks that slaves (i. e. “natural” slaves) lack the capacity to reason for themselves, but they can follow the explanations offered by their masters, and as a result they are more amenable to orders.¹⁵ The situation is not very different in dealing with children and generally young people. Their ability to reason is less than fully developed, but they can appreciate appropriate explanations and hence are more likely to accept precepts to which an explanation is added. That said, I want to state clearly what I am not claiming: namely, that in *To Demonicus* every precept is accompanied by an explanation. Some are not (e. g., 14, 16, 29), but the overwhelming majority are.¹⁶

5) Both texts make use of the second person singular imperative. As befits an address directed toward a particular individual, Isocrates uses the second person imperative in giving advice to Demonicus (13–14). The second person is maintained throughout the entire paraenetic portion (13–43), after which the author comments on the precepts and urges Demonicus to achieve nobility in his behavior (44–52). Second person address recedes, and in the final two sections we find δεῖ plus an infinitive (51, 52) as well as the pronoun τις. In the Theophrastean fragment, the second person imperative appears in the concluding section: πειρῶ “try” (fr. 523. 4). However, in the preceding sections the second person imperative is not used: we have an impersonal construction involving χρή plus infinitive, the verbal adjective ending in -έον,

dress involving γάρ-clauses, the explanation naturally comes second, but there is no reason why the explanation cannot come first.

¹⁵ Slaves are able to perceive or appreciate reason (*Pol.* 1. 2. 1254 b 22–23). Hence, we should admonish them even more than we do children (*Pol.* 1. 5. 1260 b 5–7) and not withhold reasoning when we punish them (*Rhet.* 2. 3. 1380 b 18–20). In opposing simple commands that lack explanation, Aristotle is opposing Plato, who in the *Laws* has the Athenian Stranger speak in favor of simple commands when dealing with slaves (6. 777 E – 778 A, cf. the medical treatment of slaves 4. 719 E – 720 C). See W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 1975, repr. 2002) 54–55.

¹⁶ It would be unreasonable to insist that every precept in paraenetic address be accompanied by an explanation. Paraenesis is practical, so that an explanation need not be offered when it will contribute little or nothing. Cf. Plato’s *Laws*: although the value of an explanatory preamble is emphasized, the Athenian Stranger is made to comment that a preamble is not to be used in all cases. Discretion is left to the legislator (4. 723 C–D).

and finite verbs in the third person (1–3). If we take *To Demonicus* as our guide, we might guess that the initial sections are excerpted from an introduction that precedes advice directed at an individual in the second person.¹⁷ At first reading, that may be tempting, but it is also unlikely, for in terms of content the four sections form a coherent whole. Moreover, in the absence of additional evidence, it would be wrong to assume that Theophrastus follows Isocrates in every detail.¹⁸ In particular, I know of no rule according to which second person imperatives must be used throughout a paraenetic address. It is entirely possible that in fr. 523 we have a simple case of variation, which is intended to avoid monotony. If Theophrastus is addressing a particular individual, then section 4 addresses that individual in the second person, while sections 1–3 offer advice but in a more general format. And if Theophrastus is addressing a wider audience with no particular individual in mind, then the second person imperative is a simple (ordinary language) variation for “one ought”.

Hense marks a lacuna between sections 3 and 4.¹⁹ That is not unreasonable when one considers the rather striking jump from god and family in sections 1–3 to lending money in section 4. The lacuna might be attributed to Stobaeus or to his source or to transmission. Moreover, since neither the length of the lacuna nor its content can be determined with certainty, we might declare further discussion otiose. I am sympathetic to such a position, but equally I think it important to take note of an unstated assumption: namely, that paraenetic address ought to proceed and regularly does proceed in an orderly manner. For persons with a well-ordered mind, the assumption has its appeal, but I know of no rule according to which a paraenetic address must be so ordered that

¹⁷ Cf. *Dem.* 5: ὧν χρῆ τὸς νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι etc. The words occur early in the introductory portion of *To Demonicus*, where Isocrates tells the addressee in general terms what he will be recommending. To avoid any possible confusion, I want differentiate clearly between points 4) and 1). Here in point 4), I am considering the possibility that the first three sections of fr. 523 present introductory material. That is different from point 1) above, where I considered the idea that introductory material may have preceded the first three sections of fr. 523.

¹⁸ At one time or another, Theophrastus may well have read *To Demonicus*; he may have studied it with care. But it would be reckless to think that Theophrastus has chosen *To Demonicus* as a model, from which deviation is a failing.

¹⁹ See above n. 9.

related subjects follow each other.²⁰ Indeed, in *To Demonicus*, immediately following the precepts concerning gods, parents and children, Isocrates jumps to physical exercises that promote health, and from there to violent laughter (15). Subsequently he returns to gods and parents (16). Those of us with a penchant for coherent arrangement may want to fault Isocrates for jumping about. Or we might guess that he drew upon an existing collection that was already jumbled. But in the texts before us, it seems prudent to keep in mind that our preferences may not be those of the authors.²¹ Indeed, it might be helpful to recall that Aelian defends jumping about as a way to prevent boredom.²² But of course, he lived many centuries after Isocrates and Theophrastus.

A possible concern is the lack of a transitional word at the beginning of section 4 of the Theophrastean fragment. The first three sections are joined by transitional words: “then”, ἔπειτα (2) and “furthermore”, καὶ μῆν (3), so that one is apt to feel the absence of such a word or expression at the beginning of section 4. And that in turn might encourage one to mark a lacuna. But again I know of no rule requiring transitional words between each and every precept. Moreover, if *To Demonicus* is our guide, then we can assert that precepts independent of one another need no transitional word.²³ That does not mean that Hense is wrong to posit a lacuna. There may be one, but absence of a transitional word is not proof. What we can say is that the repeated use of transitional words in sections 1–3 suggests that Theophrastus viewed the material as a unit, and the fact that section 4 lacks a transitional word suggests a new beginning or unit.

In conclusion, I want to suggest that individual passages in *To Demonicus* can be suggestive when discussing the lost works of Theophrastus. I limit myself to two examples. One concerns the work *On Friend-*

²⁰ According to J. Gammie, *Paraenesis: Act and Form* (Atlanta 1990) 49, 52, lack of connection between precepts is a feature of paraenetic address.

²¹ I am not suggesting that either Isocrates or Theophrastus regularly ignored coherent arrangement. My point is simply that a preference that is appropriate in certain contexts may not hold or be in play everywhere.

²² Ael. *NA* 435. 4–18 Hercher.

²³ A quick glance at *Dem.* 13–43 makes clear that precepts independent of each other need no transitional word. I add only that any given section may contain two or more precepts: e. g. sections 13 and 14 each present two precepts, while section 29 contains three, all without a transitional word.

ship (fr. 436 no. 23 FHS&G), in which Theophrastus is reported to have discussed the question whether one ought to assist a friend contrary to justice and custom (fr. 534). The work was three books long (fr. 532), so that there was considerable room to develop ideas. A case in point is the need to test friends before actually making them friends. Several texts tell us that Theophrastus made explicit reference to this need (fr. 538 A–F), and all do so in a quite general way. What we miss is specific advice concerning how one ought to test potential friends. That omission is not present in *To Demonicus*. There friendship gets unusually full treatment including specific recommendations concerning how friends ought to be tested. *Demonicus* is enjoined to find out how the potential friend has treated his friends, to proceed slowly, to pretend to be in want, to share apparent secrets as if they really are secrets and to learn from the misfortunes of life (24–25). My guess is that in *On Friendship*, Theophrastus did not satisfy himself by simply stating in gnomic fashion the need to test potential friends. Rather, in the manner of Isocrates he set forth a string of precepts that gave more specific advice and wherever appropriate added explanations to these precepts.²⁴

The second example concerns the work entitled Ὀμιλητικός (fr. 436 no. 32). The title is found only in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastean texts. In the 1992 collection of Theophrastean fragments, the title was translated (*Dialogue*) *concerning Social Interaction*. That may be correct, but we should keep in mind that not only διάλογος but also λόγος can be understood with Ὀμιλητικός. And if the latter is preferred, than we might translate (*Address*) *concerning Social Interaction*, which could refer to paraenesis. That did not escape Dirlmeier,²⁵ who recognized a connection with *To Demonicus* 30, where Isocrates writes, “Be affable, ὀμιλητικός, to those who approach and not haughty. For slaves can barely endure the burden of arrogant individuals, but everyone bears with pleasure the manner of affable individuals”. Here we have an imperative followed by an explanation (γίγνου ... γάρ), which is standard in *To Demonicus*. In his Ὀμιλητικός, Theophrastus may have devoted considerable attention to analysis, i. e., marking off the affable individual from the person who is rough and the person who is unctuous, but if

²⁴ In *Dem.* 24–25, γάρ is used to introduce an explanation four times.

²⁵ F. Dirlmeier, *Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts*, *Philologus Supplementbd.* 30 (Leipzig 1937) 7.

Theophrastus did engage in analysis, he also may have made room for paraenetic address, not only directing the reader to behave in an affable manner but also spelling out the kind of behavior that must be avoided. That is what Isocrates does in a comparatively long section that is marked by a conscious use of the negative μή/μηδέ (10 times) and a participial construction (31). Whether we find the section pleasing or overdone, we can agree that paraenesis as we meet it in *To Demonicus* does not limit itself to simple imperatives. That Theophrastus embraced paraenesis and at the same time made room for changes in format is, I think, likely, but in regard to the work entitled Ὀμιλητικός, we can only speculate.

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Для правильной оценки роли, которую играли этические наставления у ранних перипатетиков, необходимо учитывать не только сочинения в жанре “портретика” и этические трактаты, но также и жанр увещания (παράνεσις). Автор обращает внимание на содержательное и формальное сходство между наставительной речью *К Демонику* (псевдо-)Исократ, классическим образцом увещания (13–14), и дошедшим в *Антологии* Стобея 3, 3, 43 фрагментом Теофраста (fr. 523 FHS&G). Оба текста начинаются с совета регулярно приносить жертвы богам, за которым следует предписание заботиться о состарившихся родителях; во фрагменте Теофраста есть также увещания заботиться о жене и детях и разумно давать деньги в займы. В обоих текстах используются предписания в форме императива 2 лица. Примечательно также, что правила поведения в обоих случаях часто (хотя и не всегда) сопровождаются обоснованиями. Автор приходит к выводу, что этот, а также некоторые другие фрагменты Теофраста восходят к произведениям увещательного жанра. Кроме того, свободный переход от одной темы к другой, характерный для наставлений в речи *К Демонику* (13–43), позволяет думать, что предположение издателей о лакуне во фрагменте Теофраста, хотя и имеет известные основания, далеко не бесспорно.